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Abstract
Measuring effective tax rates using tax revenue data is attractive, given that revenues
collected capture the net effect of tax provisions and taxpayer behaviour that are difficult to
model. Yet reliance on aggregate tax and income data requires restrictive assumptions and
significantly limits the scope of analysis. This paper considers advantages of relying on
micro-data gathered from tax returns to assess average tax rates on labour, capital and transfer
income and presents some illustrative results. The analysis emphasises the importance of
matching taxpayerlevel information to income flows, and notes difficulties in interpreting tax
rates that average over all taxpayers. It also illustrates the importance of loss adjustments in
measuring effective tax rates on capital income, and reports evidence of significant variation
in corporate average tax rates by sector and firm size.
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A) INTRODUCTION
This paper reports work by Delegates of Working Party No.2 of the OECD Committee on
Fiscal Affairs (CFA) examining the use of taxpayer-level “micro-data” to assess average tax rates
on various income types.  The work may be seen as follow-up to that published in Tax Burdens–
Alternative Measures, OECD Tax Policy Studies No.2, which examines various “backward-
looking” and “forward-looking” tax burden measures.
1  The purpose of the exercise is to examine
in greater detail backward-looking measures, and in particular, to draw out relative strengths of
tax revenue-based approaches relying on micro-data collected from personal and corporate
income tax returns, as an alternative to measures based on aggregate tax revenue data as reported
in OECD Revenue Statistics.
Interest in the calculation of average tax rates on various categories of income, for example
labour or capital income, measured using tax revenue data, can be traced to at least three
considerations.  First, other often-cited tax rates, including statutory tax rates, and marginal and
average effective tax rates based on models of taxpayer behaviour, may provide limited
information on tax burdens on labour and capital income.  Depending on the modelling approach,
forward-looking measures tend to give less than full consideration of certain factors that influence
the amount of tax collected, and therefore may provide imprecise indicators of tax burdens on
employment, savings and investment activities.
Statutory tax rates, while relevant to tax-planning incentives, work effort and investment
decisions, ignore special tax allowances, tax credits and other provisions important to effective tax
rate calculations.  Marginal effective tax rates (METRs), while taking into account a number of
factors thought relevant to work and investment behaviour, ignore factors pertaining to infra-
marginal activities and tax-planning, which may be important in assessing tax burdens and
incentive effects of tax systems.  Similarly, forward-looking average effective tax rates derived
for capital income, while capturing the taxation of infra-marginal rents and provisions relevant to
the after-tax cost of acquiring capital, take less than full account of tax-minimising strategies, the
influence of business loss carryover provisions, and other factors determining actual tax burdens
on income from capital.3
Backward-looking average tax rates, on the other hand, measured using actual revenue
figures, take into account the effects of statutory income tax rates, tax deductions and tax credits
in determining the tax take.  They also take into account the effects of tax planning, tax relief
provided by lax or discretionary administrative practice, as well as non-compliance.  Thus
revenue-based average tax rates in principle offer certain advantages in measuring actual tax
burdens.  However, as backward-looking measures, they may give misleading information on
effective taxation of returns on prospective investment.  On the other hand, given that they
account for tax planning, they may be useful in assessing the likely tax burden on past investment.
They could be used, for example, as a check against model-based average effective tax rate
(AETR) measures that are properly forward-looking, but ignore factors that may be of critical
importance in particular cases.
In addition to these possible advantages encouraging the use of actual tax return data, there
is a view, perhaps mistaken, that average tax rate analysis based on revenue data is intrinsically a
simpler exercise than model-based approaches, for example AETR analysis.  In particular, there is
no need to delve into the detailed rules that go into the determination of capital cost allowances,
investment tax credits, the cost of financial capital, and so on, that must be encoded into a METR
or AETR formula.  The net effect of these and other rules on tax burdens is captured in the
(numerator) measure of tax revenues collected.
Third, it is recognised that, whatever the relative strengths of average tax rates based on
aggregate revenue data, such numbers will be generated, quoted, interpreted and used to influence
tax policy debate.  Given this, an interest emerges in developing a better understanding of what
goes into the making of average tax rates based on aggregate data, and what can and cannot be
made of them.
With this background, Delegates of Working Party No.2 agreed to a project that would
consider and implement frameworks relying on micro-level data to assess average tax rates on
various categories of income.  This work would build on earlier work undertaken by the group in
this area.
2  The results from the project would be of interest in their own right, while at the same
time could shed light on the extent to which average tax rates derived from aggregate (e.g.
Revenue Statistics and National Accounts) data could be used to inform policy debate.  A number4
of Delegates volunteered (or were asked to volunteer!) to assist in this project, relying on
confidential data drawn from tax returns.  This paper provides a summary of work undertaken by
Delegates from Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark and Norway, reporting on the use of
taxpayer-level data to assess average tax rates on labour, capital, and transfer income.
Section B) of the paper reviews work by Norway and Denmark focusing on advantages that
micro-data offer in isolating tax revenues raised from various types of income.  This precision
enables a check on results derived from aggregate data, and possibly more accurate estimates of
economy-wide average tax rates on labour, capital and transfer income.  This section also reviews
work by Austria that serves to illustrate the strengths of micro-data in permitting the computation
of average tax rates on labour income at various wage levels, and across different household
types.
Section C) reports work by Belgium and Canada analysing how micro-data can be used to
calculate average tax rates at the corporate level on income from capital.  This work is important,
given widespread policy interest in assessing average corporate tax rates, and given the general
inability of aggregate data to generate a meaningful annual corporate average tax rate series.  The
considerations also have implications for implicit capital tax rates derived from aggregate data.  A
number of examples are provided to illustrate the impact of cyclical effects on corporate tax
burden measures, the importance of correcting for business losses in average tax rate calculations,
and possible adjustments using micro-data.  This section also reports variations in tax rates at the
industry level and by firm size.  Section D) briefly concludes.
B) ASSESSING AVERAGE TAX RATES ON PERSONAL INCOME
A key attribute of micro-data is the flexibility it provides, enabling the modeller to derive
average tax rates at various levels of aggregation ranging from the individual taxpayer to the
overall economy level.  While a disaggregate view is required to address many policy-related
questions, figures reporting levels and trends in the economy-wide average tax rate on different
categories of income may also be of interest – for example, to address the sharing of tax burdens
between labour and capital, and so the overall ‘fairness’ of the tax system.  Macro-modellers may
also be interested in single, economy-wide tax rate series for labour and capital income.  This5
section considers advantages of relying on micro-data to assess economy-wide average tax rates
on labour income, with reference to the Norwegian tax system.  It also reports on economy-wide
average tax rates on transfer income based on micro-data, with illustrations by Denmark.  These
strengths are assessed relative to the implicit tax rate approach that relies on aggregate Revenue
Statistics and National Accounts data.
3
A main concern with implicit tax rate analysis is the relatively crude manner in which
revenues from a given comprehensive or schedular personal income tax are allocated across
(attributed to) different categories of income included in the tax base.  The implicit tax rate
method in effect assumes that a single economy-wide average tax rate on personal income may be
taken as the effective tax rate on all income included in the personal tax base for all taxpayers.
4
This assumption is generally unrealistic, and calls for more detailed work as considered in this
paper.  As reviewed below, micro-data permit a more targeted assessment of the amount of
personal income tax revenue raised from labour income and other types of income.  This in turn
may enable improved estimates of average tax rates by income type, or more generally, provide
results that confirm or lead one to reconsider certain results based on aggregate data.
Obtaining good estimates of the (notional) allocation of personal tax revenues across
income types, to calculate economy-wide average tax rates on labour, capital and other income, is
important, given the importance of this tax.  In OECD Europe, taxes on personal income
accounted for roughly one-quarter of total tax revenues in 2000.  In OECD America, almost 40
per cent of revenues were raised from personal income tax, while in OECD Pacific the figure was
about 30 per cent.
In addition to offering possible refinements to economy-wide average tax rate measures,
micro-data enable disaggregate analysis to guide policy-making.  For example, in assessing
distribution effects of the tax system, and the impact of taxation on labour markets, attention may
be given to effective tax rates on wage income measured separately for various taxpayer groups
that differ by income level and household structure.  The ability to measure average tax rates for
different taxpayer groups is important to the extent that effective tax rates vary across taxpayer
groups (i.e. the tax wedge depends on the income level and the household structure).  It is also6
important to the extent that the behavioural response to a given tax wedge differs depending on
the taxpayer situation.
5
To illustrate this point, work by Austria is reviewed which finds significant variability in
average tax rates on wage income across wage levels.  This raises questions over the use of
implicit labour tax rates to assess the tax burden on labour income taxed on a progressive basis, as
reliance on aggregate data means that only a single summary labour tax burden measure may be
assessed for a given country in a given year.  Attempts to use average tax rates to assess fairness
in the tax system are therefore severely limited without information on the distribution of the tax
burden.  The paper argues that assessments of the possible impact of the tax system on labour
market participation are strengthened where one is able to measure average tax rates on labour
income at various income levels and for different taxpayer groups.
Analysis by Austria shows that an average tax rate measure, even if derived for a tax that
applies to one type of income alone, for example a wage tax on labour income, may not be
particularly informative for policy purposes where the rate is derived from aggregated data.
Problems of interpretation are shown to arise where the average tax rate measure is sensitive to
the distribution of labour income, as for example under a progressive tax rate structure.  These
problems may become pressing where employment concerns are concentrated on blue-collar
workers, for example, earning an average production wage.
1) Isolating Revenues from Different Income Categories
Examples by Norway and Denmark illustrate how micro-data may permit more direct
measurement of the amount of tax revenue raised from different categories or types of income.
There may be policy interest, for example, in measuring average tax rates on capital income, or on
labour income, or more narrowly on wage and salary income, or transfer income.
6  In such cases,
two advantages may be identified when relying on micro-data – one in relation to the treatment of
taxes that include a single category or type of income in the tax base, and another in relation to
taxes with two or more types of income in the tax base and where a notional revenue split is
required.
a) Identification of taxes levied on a single income category7
Where there is policy interest in measuring the effective tax rate on a specific category of
income, and a given tax is levied on that income category alone (as can occur under a schedular
tax system), in general the revenues from that tax should be accounted for in their entirety when
measuring an average tax rate for that income.  However, when relying on aggregate personal
income tax revenue data, the revenues from such a tax are typically factored in only partially.
Under the implicit tax rate approach, aggregate personal tax revenues are scaled to approximate a
notional labour tax component.  In contrast, the use of micro-data can permit the identification
and separate measurement of the relevant tax revenue amount.  This precision holds out certain
advantages, as the implications of partial inclusion are generally unknown, leading to uncertainty
over the accuracy of implicit tax rate results.
The Norwegian dual income tax example illustrates this advantage.  Under this schedular
system, tax is imposed at a flat (proportional) rate on ordinary income, which includes labour and
capital income.
 7  Separately, an income surtax is imposed under a two-step progressive rate
schedule on gross labour income alone (alternatively called the tax on personal income).  Micro-
data can isolate the amount of tax collected on labour income by this income surtax, which is not
possible when working with aggregate individual income tax data – for example, when relying on
Revenue Statistics data that combines tax on ordinary income, tax on personal (labour) income,
and tax on capital income, and reports a single aggregate personal income tax revenue amount in a
given year.
8
To illustrate, consider the following equation set relying on micro-data to measure the total
amount of tax imposed in Norway in a given year on labour income:
IT(labour) = Σj(w
L
j⋅OTj) + S + SSC (1a)








where the summation term Σj is over all individual taxpayers (or alternatively a representative
weighted sample of n taxpayers, with j=1,,n).8
The first term in equation (1a) estimates the total amount of tax on ordinary income (OT)
derived from the labour income component of the ordinary income tax base, using taxpayer-
specific weights w
L
j measuring the fraction of net ordinary income that is labour income.
9  The
third term measures aggregate social security contributions collected on labour income, with the
components shown in equation (1c).  The first two, social security contributions of employees
(ΣjSSC
ee
j) and the self-employed (ΣjSSC
se
j), are levied on labour income.
10  The third, employer
social security contributions (ΣjSSC
er
j), is levied on wage and salaries alone.  All three
contributions relate to labour income, and may be included in full in estimating the total amount
of tax imposed on labour income.
This sub-section focuses on the second term S in (1a), measuring income surtax revenues.
11
As with social security contributions, the surtax is imposed on labour income alone, and should be
included in full when estimating total tax revenues raised on labour income.  Working with micro-
data, this precision is possible, as reflected in equation (1a).
In contrast, the implicit tax rate approach factors in some fraction f
L of total personal
income tax revenues – comprised of ordinary income tax plus income surtax revenues – in




L(OT+S) + SSC (2)
where OT denotes total tax revenues on ordinary income, S denotes total income surtax revenues,
and SSC denotes total social security contributions.
When comparing equations (1a) and (2), two differences are evident.  First, the micro-data
approach allows one to rely on taxpayer-specific weights (w
L
j), rather than an overall average
weight (f
L), when estimating the labour component of the tax on ordinary income.  The
advantages of relying on taxpayer-specific weights are taken up in section 1)b).
Second, whereas the income surtax (tax on personal (labour) income) is accounted for in full
in equation (1a), only some fraction (f
L) of S is included in the implicit tax rate model, with the
weight (f
L) assessed as the percentage of total individual income that is labour income.  As noted,
given that the base of S is labour income alone, the surtax amount should be included in full in9
measuring total tax imposed on labour income, to feed into the corresponding calculation of the
average tax rate on labour.
When working with aggregate data, the implications are generally unclear of partially rather
than fully including the income surtax.  The potential for under-estimating labour tax revenues
(and thus the average tax rate on labour income) increases the larger is the contribution of the
surtax to total tax revenues collected on labour income.  However, the percentage contribution of
the income surtax is uncertain where one only has access to aggregate personal income tax
revenue statistics, as reported in Revenue Statistics.
Analysis by Norway of average tax rates on labour income
Work by Norway investigates the importance of this particular advantage of micro-data in







L = W/OY (3b)
where the first term (w
L⋅OT) gives an estimate of the labour portion of total tax revenues raised on
ordinary income, S is total income surtax, SSC is total social security contributions, SSC
er is total
employer social security contributions, and W denotes labour income.  The scaling factor used to
weight total tax on ordinary income is given by (3b), where W includes total wages and salaries of
employees plus the total labour portion of remuneration of the self-employed, and OY measures
total ordinary income.
14  The average tax rate on labour income (including pension income) is
estimated to be 33.1 per cent on average over the period 1997-1999 when relying on tax return
data.
Under the implicit tax rate approach, the income surtax S is factored into the numerator only





When relying on aggregate data, the average effective tax rate on labour is estimated to be
33.0 per cent in the same period.  Thus, the micro-data are useful in this instance in lending10
support to the results derived from aggregate data.  In particular, including the income surtax in
part rather than in full is shown to not materially affect estimates of the average tax rate on labour
income in Norway over the years considered.  This finding reflects the relatively low percentage
contribution of the surtax to the total tax on labour income.  Conversely, in systems where a tax
levied on a single income category accounts for a more significant portion of total tax on that
income (with that amount ‘buried’ in aggregate tax data), the use of micro-data could provide for
more precise average tax rate measures.
b) Treatment of taxes levied on multiple income types
Micro-data may also enable more precise measurement of the amount of tax imposed on a
given category or type of income by a tax that includes more than one type of income in its tax
base.  Depending on what average tax rate is being measured, interest arises in accurately
measuring tax collected, for example, on labour income, or wage income, or transfer income.  In
such cases, micro data allows one to link features of a tax system that treat different types of
income differently to the distribution of these income flows across taxpayers subject to varying
average tax rates.
To take an example, when tasked with measuring an average tax rate on labour income, and
given the need to incorporate an estimate of the (notional) amount of tax revenue raised from a
broad-based tax that can be attributed to labour income, the use of taxpayer-level data can more
closely assess the influence of special features targeted at labour income.
15  This section draws on
sub-section 1)a) focusing on the Norwegian tax system, and examines how micro-data can be
used to measure the amount of total tax on ordinary income that can be tied to labour income, or
more narrowly, wage income.
16
Consider first a simple framework that illustrates how micro-data may be used to estimate
the (notional) amount of tax revenues raised by a given tax on a specific type of income (e.g.
personal income tax on wage income) where that income is included with other types of income in
the tax base.  The general results obtained can be compared with those under the implicit tax rate
methodology.  While the analysis focuses on measuring an average tax rate on labour income, the
issues raised generally carry over when assessing the tax burden on other types of income
included in a broadly defined (pooled) tax base.  We then turn to an application of the general11
approach by Denmark, which considers a broad-based personal income tax and focuses on
assessing personal tax revenues derived from pension and benefit income.
The illustrative framework assumes an economy with two taxpayers (1 and 2) and a single
tax (e.g. personal income tax) levied on taxable income that includes labour income Wj and
‘other’ income Yj, where j is an index over taxpayers (j=1,2).
Taxpayer 1
We can model taxpayer 1’s personal income tax liability in a general fashion as follows:
PIT1= t(W1+Y1-λE1-A)-C1 (5a)
where t denotes the personal income tax rate,
17 W1 measures labour income, Y1 measures ‘other’
taxable income, λE1 measures deductible expenses in earning ‘other’ income with the deductible
portion λ given by the tax code, A measures a basic tax allowance, and C1 denotes a general or
targeted tax credit.
18
The portion of taxpayer 1’s personal income tax liability linked to labour income can be estimated
as the portion that labour income is to the taxpayer’s total economic (or accounting) income:
PIT(lab)1= PIT1⋅(W1/(W1+Y1-E1)) = f
L
1⋅PIT1. (5b)
The amount raised from ‘other’ income is given by:
PIT(oth)1= PIT1⋅((Y1-E1)/(W1+Y1-E1)) = f
O
1⋅PIT1. (5c)











1, applied to personal income tax, are taxpayer-specific and are
determined without reference to the deduction scaling factor λ, the standard allowance or the tax
credit.  The measurement of the weights requires an assignment of the expense E1 to the relevant
income type (in the example, Y1).  Where an expense (negative income) item relates to more than
one type of income, it is necessary to allocate the expense across the relevant income amounts.
The denominator of the weights (W1+Y1-E1) is comprised of flows that establish taxpayer
1’s economic income, as opposed to the individual’s net income for tax purposes.  For practical
purposes, the modeller may resort to an accounting measure of net income.  The counterpart to
this accounting basis at the economy wide level is household income on a National Accounts
basis.  Tax provisions relevant to measuring the tax base are not taken into account in the
measurement of the denominator of the weights.  The effect of tax provisions is captured through
their impact on reported tax revenues (PIT).
Personal tax raised on a taxpayer’s labour income can be expressed as a fraction (f
L
1) of
personal income tax (see equation (5b)), or alternatively as a percentage τ1 of that taxpayer’s
labour income W1 where τ1 is taxpayer 1’s average tax rate on personal income:
τ1= PIT1/(W1+Y1-E1) (5f)
Taxpayer 2




2⋅PIT2 = τ2⋅W2 (6b)
PIT(oth)2= f
O








For each taxpayer, the tax rate τj is an average rate over the taxpayer’s labour and ‘other’
income – in other words, income-specific tax rates for each taxpayer are not derived in this
framework.
19  However, the rates are taxpayer specific, with τj reflecting taxpayer j’s taxable
position.  In particular, this rate depends on the level of taxpayer j’s total taxable income where
the tax rate schedule denoted by t is progressive and/or where standard (fixed) allowances are
provided.  Individual tax rates may also differ across taxpayers depending on the composition of
income to the extent that personal income tax deductions and/or credits are targeted at (or earned
in respect of) different income types, and income composition varies across taxpayers.
In the context of the model, when comparing results for taxpayer 1 and taxpayer 2 (i.e.
comparing equations (5a) and (6a), and (5f) and (6f)), the average income tax rate for taxpayer 1
(τ1) can differ from that for taxpayer 2 (τ2) to the extent that:
•  taxpayer 1 and taxpayer 2 have different levels of (pre-tax) income, and the personal tax rate
structure (t) is progressive and/or standard allowances (A) are provided; and/or
•  taxpayer 1 and taxpayer 2 have the same (pre-tax) income level, but different income
composition, and different tax payable due to income- or expenditure-specific tax
deductions and/or tax credit claims (as denoted by λEi and Ci).
While the approach measures a single average income tax rate for a given taxpayer in a given
year, the micro-data allow one to assess different average tax rates for different taxpayers, and
thereby enable notional tax revenue and overall average tax rate estimates for different categories
of income that take into account different taxpayer situations.
Measuring average tax rates on labour income
Using these micro data results, an average tax rate on labour income, and an average tax
rate on ‘other’ income can be derived taking into account potentially important taxpayer-level
information.  For illustrative purposes, consider the measurement of the average tax rate on labour
income, which we can denote by τ
L(micro).  This rate is determined by adding the taxpayer-level
(notional) amounts of personal tax on labour income and dividing by aggregate labour income, as
follows:14
τ
L(micro) = (τ1⋅W1+τ2⋅W2)/(W1+W2) (7a)
where the taxpayer-level personal tax rates are given by:
τi = PITi/(Wi+Yi-Ei)          (i=1,2) (7b)
The point to emphasise is that the estimate of total tax revenues derived from labour income,
appearing in the numerator of the average tax rate calculation (7a), is determined using taxpayer-
specific (rather than overall) average personal income tax rates.  In particular, labour income at
the taxpayer-level is weighted using taxpayer-specific tax rates (τi).
In contrast, when working with aggregate data, as under the implicit tax rate approach, the
estimate of total tax revenues derived from labour income is derived by applying a single (overall)







agg = ⋅∑PITi/∑(Wi+Yi–Ei) (8b)
Compare the two approaches.  The micro-data approach links features of the tax system
determining average income tax rates of individual wage earners with the distribution of wage
income across taxpayers (similarly for ‘other’ income).  In estimating the notional amount of
revenue raised from labour income, the micro-data framework weights labour income at the
taxpayer level with taxpayer-specific tax rates.  Depending on the distribution of wage income in
the economy, and the variation in average tax rates at the taxpayer level, the resulting estimate of
the notional amount of tax revenue raised on labour income could differ markedly from that
obtained when relying on an overall economy-wide average tax rate, as under the implicit tax rate
approach.
To elaborate this point, consider the situation where labour income is concentrated in the
hands of taxpayer 1 (with ‘other’ income in the hands of taxpayer 2), and taxpayer 1’s average tax
rate τ1 is lower than that of taxpayer 2 (and thus lower than the overall rate τ
agg).  Then weighting15
labour income by τ1 would provide a closer approximation of tax revenues raised from labour
income than relying on τ
agg.  In practice, wage income is dispersed among taxpayers and the
importance of using taxpayer-specific rather than overall economy-wide average tax rates is an
empirical question.  Yet the use of taxpayer-level data holds out the advantage where such
differences are important.
Analysis by Denmark of average effective tax rates on transfer income
Work by Denmark analyses how taxpayer-level data can be used to disaggregate personal
income tax revenues into notional component parts, and derive corresponding average effective
tax rates, using an approach along the lines set out in the simple framework discussed above.  The
results reported in Table 1 show significant variation in average tax rates across different types of
transfer income, indicating that the distribution of transfer income across taxpayers differs
depending on the specific type of transfer income.  The results also show the relative importance
of tax allowances for different taxpayers earning different types of transfer income.  For example,
tax allowances are shown to have little effect on average effective tax rates on social pensions and
low income transfers, while lowering rates on unemployment benefits and sickness benefits by 4
to 5 percentage points.16
TABLE 1
Average Effective Tax Rates on
Various Types of Social Transfers, Denmark




Social pensions 29.25 29.20
Supplementary pension 31.46 31.38
Civil servants pension 38.72 38.47
Early retirement pension 31.60 30.81
Sickness benefits 32.29 28.25
Parental leave 28.50 22.26
Educational allowance 20.96 20.07
Support, start enterprise 28.91 25.15




Low income 29.12 28.57
Source: Ministry of Finance, Denmark.17
2) Addressing Progressivity and Income Distribution Effects
Average tax rate measures for labour income may be of policy interest where there are
concerns that the tax system is not sufficiently progressive, or more generally does not adequately
address income distribution concerns.  Such measures may also be of interest where concerns
exist that the tax system is creating a large wedge between gross (pre-tax) labour costs and the
after-tax take-home pay of workers, discouraging labour market participation.  However,
measuring a representative average tax rate is difficult when relying on aggregate data, as the net
impact of progressive tax rate structures, tax allowances and tax credits can differ, sometimes
significantly, depending on the gross wage level and household structure.
For example, the effect of a fixed allowance in offsetting tax is relatively more pronounced
at low earnings.  Tax allowances and credits may be subject to thresholds and have tapering
(phasing-in and phasing-out) provisions, where again the relative importance of such measures
depends on gross earnings.  Where the average tax rate on labour income varies with gross
income, the relevance of an average tax rate derived using aggregate data is less than clear.  An
analysis of Austrian data shows that average tax rates on labour income derived on the basis of
aggregated tax revenue data are representative for only a narrow band of wage earners.  In
contrast, reliance on micro-data can provide a range of effective tax rate calculations of policy
interest.
Austrian micro-data gather separate series for taxes assessed on labour income, including
wage taxes, (final) income taxes, and social security contributions.  While final income tax
assessments determine the final income tax burden on labour income, the wage tax statistics
(reflecting a prepayment of income tax) offer timely insights into average tax rates on labour
income at various wage levels.  The figures closely approximate the ‘true’ tax burden figures
where final assessments result in minimal adjustments, and offer the advantage of being available
a year before the final income tax data.  Furthermore, wage tax statistics are compiled separately
for employees (Table 2) and pensioners (Table 3).  This feature is attractive where one is
interested in examining the impact of the tax system on employment incentives for a particular
taxpayer group (employees), with reference to effective tax rates on current wages (as opposed to
pension income taxed as ordinary income).  The data show that removing pensioners from the18
sample sharpens the focus of the exercise, with total wage tax paid by pensioners amounting to
over 48 billion ATS in 1999, or roughly 23 per cent of total wage tax collected in that year.
Moreover, effective tax rates are shown to differ between pensioner and employee groups at
various income levels.
The average tax rate (ATR) analysis for employees in Table 2 derives two average tax rate
series, one for wage taxes (τ
L










where WT measures wages taxes withheld on wage income, SSC
ee measures employee social
security contributions, and W measures gross wages and salaries of employees (wages and
salaries recorded net of SSC
ee, plus SSC
ee).  Employer social security contributions and payroll
taxes are not included (although these could be factored in).  Instead, the analysis focuses on wage
tax and employee social security contribution components of average effective tax rates on labour,
and draws out a number of useful observations.
20
First, the results reveal that a single average tax rate derived using aggregate taxpayer data
provides limited tax burden information in the Austrian example, even where the relevant tax
revenues on labour income can be isolated (as they can, in this example in the case of the wage
tax).  In particular, Table 2 shows that the average tax rate on wage income, derived at an
aggregate level for all employees as a group, at 17.3 per cent, corresponds to the average tax rate
on wages of taxpayers with gross income of roughly 550 thousand ATS.  This rate is nearly
double that applicable to those with average wage earnings of 300 thousand ATS, and triple the
rate applicable to those with gross earnings in the range of 50-200 thousand ATS.  Given this
variability, it is unclear how one should interpret in a policy context the overall figure of 17.3 per
cent.  Taking this as an estimate of the tax burden on ‘labour’ to be compared with that on
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eRather than generating a single ‘representative’ value, the micro-data approach solves for
average tax rates at various income levels.  This range of values allows one to assess how the
various Austrian personal tax provisions combine to shape the degree of progressivity in the
system.  Furthermore, average tax rate figures derived from actual tax return data may be helpful
in assessing how the tax system has impacted on employment activity – for example, on labour
market participation decisions.
21
However, interpreting a stationary or variable single rate over time, derived from aggregate
data is difficult, given the variability in average tax rates across income levels, and the sensitivity
of the overall rate to the pre-tax income distribution.  By enabling tax rate calculations at various
income levels, micro-data allows one to more readily associate average tax rates with a
corresponding income level.  This may be helpful where employment problems tend to be acute
for employees at certain earnings levels (e.g., low-paid labour).  Also, the micro-data results allow
one to more readily identify differences in effective tax rates over time (and across countries) at
various income levels resulting from differences in tax policy (affecting tax base and statutory
rates), as opposed to differences in pre-tax earnings distribution.
The micro-data also permit the calculation of “discrete change” tax rates (DTR) which
examine how the tax burden changes with discrete increases in gross wage income.  These rates
are not true marginal rates, as they are measured for discrete rather than unit increases in gross
wage income, and do not reflect tax changes arising solely from changes in gross wage income
(based on actual tax revenues, the DTR measure does not hold other factors constant).
22  The DTR
results for wage income may be potentially useful when addressing the impact of the tax system
on work incentives for those already in work, who consider the net benefits of additional work
effort.  In particular, the results may be usefully compared with marginal tax rate results derived
from a micro-simulation model focusing on tax effects resulting from a unit increase in gross
wages, holding other factors constant (as in OECD Taxing Wages).  With access to only aggregate
income tax or wage tax revenues, assessing effective tax rates ‘at the margin’ in this way using
actual tax revenue figures is not possible.
In addition, the micro-data set reveals differences in the tax burden imposed by alternative
taxes on wage income at various earnings levels, which may be useful if policy makers wish to22
target tax relief to a particular group of workers.  To take an example, for employees earning
roughly 300 thousand ATS in gross wages, employee social security contributions impose a tax
burden roughly twice that imposed by the wage tax.  In contrast, for those earning in excess of
600 thousand ATS, the wage tax burden is higher, and increases as wages climb above this mark.
Thus reductions in social security contribution rates would tend to favour low- to median-wage
earners.  While such impacts can be inferred from the statutory provisions relevant to each tax, the
availability of micro-based effective tax rates provides the analyst with a useful source of
information to assess distributional effects, estimate the fiscal cost, and steer policy decisions.
C) ASSESSING AVERAGE TAX RATES ON CORPORATE INCOME
This section focuses on the use of micro-data to assess corporate average tax rates, and
identifies problems and limitations encountered when relying on aggregate data, based on
contributions by Belgium and Canada.  The discussion does not address difficulties in relying on
aggregate data to measure average tax rates on income from capital more generally (covering
corporate and shareholder-level taxes), although the findings presented on the corporate side have
implications that carry over.
The attention given to average tax rates at the corporate level is motivated in part by the
high degree of policy interest in corporate-level tax burdens.  For example, in an open economy
context, there is interest in examining separately the effective tax rate on corporate profits to
address the possible negative impact that taxation may have on (direct) investment incentives.
Also, there are often concerns captured in the press that corporations are not paying their “fair”
share of tax.  The review focuses first on the need to make adjustments in respect of business
losses to obtain meaningful average tax rate measures, which requires access to micro-data.  Such
adjustments are shown in the country work to be very important.  Indeed, the inability to properly
account and adjust for losses when relying solely on aggregate Revenue Statistics and National
Accounts data largely explains why implicit tax rate modellers avoid reporting implicit corporate
tax rates.
23  The work by Belgium and Canada also highlights the broad set of calculations made
possible by micro-data, including estimates of average corporate tax rates by sector, asset size,
and income strata.23
1) Accounting for Business Losses
Properly accounting for business losses and their tax treatment in the measurement of
average tax rates on corporate income is complicated in theory and practice.  One might argue that
losses and their tax treatment should be ignored, restricting attention to the treatment of firms
profitable in all years.  However, important information relevant to determining the corporate tax
burden is lost when the tax treatment of losses is ignored.
24  Important issues include the treatment
of unclaimed losses under loss carry-forward rules, and whether or not related firms are taxed on a
separate basis, or instead on a group basis allowing for the losses of one firm to offset taxable
income of related companies in the group.  Such provisions can impact significantly on corporate
tax burdens.
When relying on aggregate data, a central problem is the fact that aggregate corporate
income tax revenues appearing in the numerator of an average tax rate are reduced by losses
incurred in prior years, while the denominator is reduced by losses incurred in the current year.
The numerator effect results from loss carry-forward provisions.  The denominator effect results
from the inclusion of current year losses of current year loss-making firms, offsetting profits of
profitable firms in the same year upon aggregation.  Thus losses are factored into the numerator
and denominator, but the losses are mismatched in the sense that they are in respect of different
periods (i.e. prior year versus current year).
This timing problem could be addressed by aggregating numerator amounts (e.g., corporate
income tax) over a number of years, and dividing this by an aggregate of denominator amounts
(operating surplus of incorporated companies) summed over the same period.  The longer the
aggregation period, generally the smaller is the problem (in relative terms) of any remaining
inconsistency in loss treatment.  However, policy interest in a multi-year average tax rate declines
the longer the aggregation period.
25  This is particularly the case when tax policy changes have
occurred over this period, and one is interested in examining the impact of these changes by
examining the time profile of the effective tax rate on corporations from one year to the next.
Before turning to the work by Belgium and Canada illustrating the flexibility of micro-data
in accounting for business losses, it is useful to reflect on some of the relevant considerations.
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate problems of interpretation when relying on aggregate data alone, and how24
micro-data can be used adjust (denominator) profit figures or alternatively (numerator) tax figures
in an average tax rate (ATR) measure in order to adjust for the effects of losses.  The illustrative
examples assume that firms are able to carry losses forward (loss refunds are not provided).  Table
4 examines two firms over a four-year period, with each firm subject to an effective corporate
income tax rate of 20 per cent.
26  Firm 1 is profitable over this period, earning 20 units of profit in
each year.  Firm 2 begins operations in year 2 and incurs losses in that year, but becomes
profitable in year three and is able to carry forward its initial losses to claim against tax in year 3.
Corporate tax burden analysis based on aggregated data (shown under the Macro-data
heading) finds an average corporate tax rate ATR(agg) of 26.67% and 16% in years 2 and 3.  In
year 2, with current period losses included in year 2 aggregate (net) profits, but the tax treatment
of those losses not factored into the numerator, the effective tax rate is overstated in year 2.  In
year 3, the effective tax rate at 16% is understated due to the year claim for year 2 losses
impacting on the numerator, but without those losses factoring into the denominator.
Two types of adjustments relying on micro-data to address the mismatch in loss treatment
are considered in Table 4.  The first approach, with results shown as ATR 1, excludes current year
unclaimed losses from the denominator profit measure, and instead reduces the denominator in
respect of prior year losses, and in particular, loss carry-forward claims impacting the
numerator.
27.  In other words, where a firm incurs losses, the losses are accounted for in
measuring aggregate corporate profits in the year in which claims are made in respect of those
losses.  Rather than recognising the loss of (5) by firm 2 in measuring year 2 aggregate profits,
this loss is set off against corporate profits in year 3 when the claim is made for that loss.  This
yields an ATR value of 20% in each year in the illustration in Table 4.
An alternative approach is to include current-year profits and current-year losses in the
denominator (net) profit measure, and to adjust corporate tax revenues in the numerator in respect
of future claims on current-year losses.  In particular, where losses are realised in a given year,
corporate tax revenues for that year are reduced in respect of the present value of future claims on
those losses.  In the example, the second set of results in Table 4 (ATR 2A and ATR 2B) adjusts
aggregate tax revenues in year 2 to take into account the loss carry-forward claim in year 3 by
firm 2 in respect of its losses realised in year 2.  In particular, the loss claim in year 3 of 5 units of25
losses reduces tax in that year by 1 unit (assuming a 20 per cent corporate tax rate).  Thus, under
the adjustment without discounting, aggregate corporate tax receipts (4 units) in year 2 are
reduced from 4 to 3 units, yielding an average tax rate of 20%.
TABLE 4
Corporate ATR Implications of Relying on
Macro- versus Micro Data
-- Example 1 --
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Firm 1
profit/loss 20 20 20 20
Taxable profit 20 20 20 20
Tax (@20)4 4 4 4
Firm 2
profit/loss 0 -5 5 10
Cumulative unclaimed losses 0 -5 -5 0
loss carryforward claim 0 0 -5 0
taxable profit 0 0 0 10
tax (@20)0 0 0 2
Macro-data results
Total tax 4 4 4 6
Total profit 20 15 25 30
ATR(agg) 20% 26.67% 16% 20%
Micro-data results
Total tax 4 4 4 6
Total adjusted profit 20 20 20 30




Total profit 20 15 25 30
ATR 2A 20% 20% 20% 20%
Total adjusted tax
(r= 10%)
4 3.09 5 6
Total profit 20 15 25 30
ATR 2B 20% 20.61% 20% 20%
discount rate r 10%26
TABLE 5
Corporate ATR Implications of Relying on
Macro- versus Micro Data
-- Example 2 --
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Firm 1
profit/loss 20 20 20 20
taxable profit 20 20 20 20
tax (@20)4 4 4 4
Firm 2
profit/loss 0 -5 5 10
Cumulative unclaimed losses 0 -5 -5 0
loss carryforward claim 0 0 -5 0
taxable profit 0 0 0 10
tax (@20)0 0 0 2
Firm 3
profit/loss 0 -5 -5 -5
Cumulative unclaimed losses 0 -5 -10 -15
loss carryforward claim 0 0 0 0
taxable profit 0 0 0 0
tax (@20)0 0 0 0
Macro-data results
Total tax 4 4 4 6
Total profit 20 10 20 25
ATR(agg) 20% 40% 20% 24%
Micro-data results
Total tax 4 4 4 6
Total adjusted profit 20 20 20 30
ATR 1A 20% 20% 20% 20%
Total adjusted profit * 20 20 15 25
ATR 1B 20% 20% 27% 24%
Total adjusted tax
(r= 10%)
4 3.09 5 6
Total profit 20 10 20 25
ATR 2 20% 30.91% 25.00% 24.0%
discount rate r 10%27
The second set of results (ATR 2B) takes into account the time value of money, assuming a
10% discount rate, and deducts from aggregate corporate tax receipts the present value in year 2
of the loss claim of 5 in year 3.  The ATR of 20.61% in year 2 reflects the assumption that the tax
system does not allow losses to be carried forward with interest (as implicitly assumed in the first
set of micro-data results, ATR 2A).
Table 5 broadens the analysis by adding a third firm assumed to be in a loss position in each
year over the 4-year period.  As in Table 4, the first set of results ATR(agg) illustrate the problems
of interpretation created when (unadjusted) aggregated data are used.  The next two sets of results
are derived using adjusted profits.  The ATR 1A results ignore the losses of firm 3, which in the
example are never offset in full or in part by the tax system, in measuring corporate profits.  The
approach can be interpreted as reflecting a benchmark system that denies a loss offset to
perpetually loss-making firms.  In contrast, the ATR 1B results assume an alternative benchmark,
reducing profits in respect of prior year unrelieved losses, regardless of whether loss-making firms
eventually become profitable or not.
The ATR 2 results are derived under the alternative loss-adjustment approach of adjusting
aggregate corporate tax revenues (rather than aggregate profits) in respect of future claims on
current year losses, and assuming a benchmark profit measure that recognises the losses of all
firms.  The inability of the loss firm (Firm 3) to claim relief in respect of its losses means that
aggregate corporate tax receipts would not be adjusted downward in respect of these losses (i.e.
the present value of zero relief is zero).  The losses do however lower aggregate profit, putting
upward pressure on the corporate ATR.
The cases examined in Tables 4 and 5 serve to illustrate possible approaches relying on
micro-data to adjust for business losses.  In principle, one may wish to reduce aggregate corporate
tax revenues in respect of the present value of future claims (if any) on same period losses, rather
than following the alternative of adjusting aggregate corporate profits in respect of same period
claims on prior year losses.  A concern that arises under the latter approach is that the results tend
to blur the timing of the corporate average tax rate series – that is, the impact of losses on
aggregate corporate profits and tax is not recognised until the year(s) in which tax claims are28
taken.  Also, realised losses that never get claimed for tax purposes are ignored.  However, in
practice the profit-adjustment approach may be preferred, as the alternative is difficult to
implement, even where statutory corporate tax rates remain fixed.  Few corporate tax micro-
models are dynamically structured to provide an account, by firm, of when unutilised losses are
eventually claimed (or lost).  A manual checking of tax returns and ad hoc adjustments would
normally be required, tending to limit the focus on only large firms in the corporate sample.
Illustrations based on Micro-data
This section examines approaches by Belgium and Canada in using micro-data compiled
from tax returns to measure corporate average tax rates, in particular, domestic corporate income
tax rates on domestic source income.
28  Results are compared and contrasted with findings based
on aggregate data.  Before analysing the results, it is useful to address a number of measurement
issues.
First, measuring a corporate average tax rate involves, in general, dividing (adjusted)
corporate tax revenues by an adjusted measure of corporate profits, with a focus in each year on
(taxable and non-taxable) firms that are profitable in the year (see the discussion above
concerning alternative methods to factor in losses).  In principle, the denominator profit measure
should reflect economic income at the corporate level.  Arguably such a measure is appropriate
when assessing fairness and distribution concerns, and also where the measure is used to assess
effective tax rates on past investment (as a possible check against forward-looking tax burden
measures which ignore tax planning).  This benchmark would provide true economic depreciation,
corrections for inflation in measuring depreciation and the cost of goods sold (inventory valuation
adjustment), and factor in income from the decline in the real value of debt of the non-financial
sector during periods of inflation.  As elaborated below, the profit measures used by Belgium and
Canada do not make all of these adjustments.  The results nevertheless draw out a number of
important considerations, most importantly loss effects and variability of corporate ATRs by
sectors and firm size.
The implicit tax rate approach to measuring a corporate average tax rate, relying on
aggregate data, measures domestic tax on domestic and foreign-source income as a percentage of
the domestic operating surplus of the (domestic) incorporated sector.  Corporate operating surplus29
is a measure of the return to capital employed in the economy, net of depreciation, including
returns to debt and equity.
29  As noted above, operating surplus includes current year losses.
The Canadian AETR figures use an adjusted book income figure in the denominator,
derived at the micro-level for a weighted-sample of corporations.
30  Measuring adjusted book
income begins with net income as reported in financial statements.  This amount is adjusted to
arrive at a measure of domestic corporate profit that removes double counting of domestic
income, excludes foreign income, factors out corporate tax payments, and adjusts for losses by
netting out loss carry forward claims for tax purposes in the current year.
31  Foreign income is
excluded in the interest of focusing on domestic tax on domestic source income.
32  N o
adjustments are made in respect of depreciation.  Therefore depreciation claims used for
accounting purposes are incorporated in the benchmark profit measure.
Rather than beginning with financial income, the Belgian example begins with net taxable
income, and ‘works backwards’ to arrive at an adjusted benchmark measure of corporate profit.
Beginning with net taxable income, corporate profits are measured net of loss carry forward
claims without further adjustment.
33  Also, with net taxable income measured net of domestic
dividend income, no adjustment is required in respect of these amounts to avoid double counting
of domestic profit (with the underlying profit accounted for in the net taxable income of the
distributing company).  However, in order to ensure that profits exempted under special tax
regimes are accounted for, the exempt profits of qualifying firms are added back.
34  Disallowed
expenses (that is, expenses that reduce economic income but do not qualify for a tax deduction)
are subtracted, while tax expenditures are added back.
35  As net taxable income excludes (most)
foreign profits, no adjustment is made in respect of these amounts.
36
Turning now to the results, Figure 1 shows the Belgian corporate average tax rate based on
micro-data, along with other corporate tax rate measures, over the period 1984-1998.  The results
clearly reveal the need to factor in corporate tax base considerations, and not just the statutory
corporate rate, in assessing the corporate income tax burden.  The progressive narrowing of the
discrepancy between the statutory and the average tax rates illustrates a convergence of the actual
tax base to the benchmark profit measure in the denominator of the ATR, with the micro-data30
indicating that this results mainly from a series of tax reform measures that reduced tax
expenditures.
37
Figure 1 also shows an implicit corporate tax rate time series derived using aggregate data,
as well as an adjusted implicit tax rate series with a loss adjustment that nets out from the
denominator (corporate operating surplus) the deduction for losses factored into corporate income
tax liabilities in the numerator.
38  In years where significant corporate losses were incurred, the
implicit tax rate exceeds the ATR based on micro-data (1984 and 1991).
However, in other years the implicit tax rate is below the micro-data ATR.  Drawing from
the analysis of Table 4, this suggests that the effect of loss carry forward claims in the numerator
(in years immediately following 1984, and 1991) were more pronounced than the effect of current
year losses factoring into the denominator.  Another possible explanation is that the National
Accounts operating surplus measure is significantly broader than corporate operating surplus, due
for example to the inclusion in the National Accounts of non-taxable corporations including
government enterprises (as indicated by Norway in its work on average effective tax rates on
capital).  It may also be that corporate profits are not properly consolidated in the National
Accounts, tending to overstate the true value, as noted by Belgium.
It can also be observed from Figure 1 that trends in the corporate tax burden may be
misrepresented by implicit tax rate figures, particularly when considering short time intervals.
For example, the micro data show that the average tax rate in the corporate sector was essentially
unchanged over the three-year period 1984-1986, while the implicit tax rate results show a
reduction exceeding 8 percentage points.  Similarly, the aggregate data suggest that the corporate
average tax rate increased by 8 percentage between 1989 and 1991, while the micro-data find a
reduction in the corporate tax burden over that period.31
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A similar finding emerges from Figure 2 showing Canadian corporate average tax rates,
which factor in not only corporate income tax, but also federal capital taxes (net wealth taxes) on
corporations.
39  Results shown for the last four years included in the figure 1994-1997 compare
corporate average tax rates when loss making firms are included in the analysis, as they are under
the implicit tax rate approach, with corporate ATRs with loss firms excluded.
40  When loss-
making firms are included, the figures show a declining average corporate tax burden over the32
three-year period 1994 to 1996, while the results relying on adjusted profits of profitable firms
show an upward trend in the tax burden over this period.
2) Measuring Corporate ATRs by Sector and Firm Size
In addition to enabling an adjustment for business losses, micro-data also permit
disaggregate analyses of corporate tax burdens.  A disaggregate approach is useful, for example,
where the tax system targets preferential tax treatment to firms engaged in certain business
activities, or to firms on the basis of their size.  Policy interest naturally arises in such cases in
assessing the impact of the special tax provisions on targeted groups – investment companies in
Belgium, and manufacturing and processing companies in Canada, as examples.  Additionally, the
tax systems in both Belgium and Canada provide special tax relief to ‘small’ firms, and so policy
interest arises in comparing the tax burden across companies of different size measured by assets
or income.
41
Even in the absence of targeted measures, there may be interest in assessing the impact of
general features of the corporate tax system that affect different industries differently.  For
example, tax depreciation rules tend to be more important to firms in industries that are relatively
capital intensive, while loss treatment tends to matter more to firms in industries exhibiting strong
cyclical effects.  As the net effect of these and other features of the tax system get captured in
disaggregated average tax rates, an incentive exists to construct such rates for firms grouped by
industry (and possibly by other criteria, for example size or location).  The remainder of the paper
reviews findings by Belgium and Canada based on micro-data that illustrate a diverse of corporate
average tax rates, a diversity that tends to get masked when relying on aggregate data alone.
Certain implications for policy analysis are addressed.
a) ATR results by sector
Micro-data results by Belgium and Canada reveal significant variation in corporate average
tax rates across industries, as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.  As emphasised in the analysis
provided by Belgium, interpretation of the Belgian results by sector requires careful examination
of the underlying micro-data and an accounting for the impact of special features of corporate tax
system.33
To take an example, one striking finding is that in most of the industrial sectors (with the
exclusion of the chemical industry, and electricity and water industry) the corporate ATR is found
to exceed the statutory tax rate.  This finding, particularly pronounced for small firms, is traced to
disallowed expenses (netted from taxable profits in measuring benchmark profit) that exceed tax
expenditures (removed from benchmark profits).
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The Belgian analysis gives an insightful interpretation to average tax rates calculated for the
industry and retail trade sectors, and other ‘other services’ sector.  In particular, the analysis
cautions that the true tax burden on the industry and retail trade sectors is actually lower than that
suggested by the corporate ATRs computed for these sectors.  The reason is that part of the ‘true’
profit of these sectors is paid out in the form of interest and other deductible charges to related
companies where the amounts are received tax-free under the Belgian co-ordination centre regime
rules.  These payments are deductible in measuring tax (numerator) and pre-tax profits
(denominator) in the calculation of the corporate ATR of the industry and retail trade sectors.
Therefore, the impact of the co-ordination centre rules does not tend to be reflected in the
corporate ATRs for these sectors.  With co-ordination centres included in the ‘other services’
sector, the corporate ATR for this sector is lowered on account of the tax exemption for income
from transactions with related companies in the industry and/or retail trade sectors under the co-
ordination regime (in other words, the ‘other services’ sector corporate ATR would be higher if
co-ordination companies were excluded).
The corporate ATR analysis by Canada reveals the need to distinguish firms by industry
when considering trends in the corporate tax burden over time.  In particular, when considering all
profitable firms, the results show an increase in the corporate ATR in 1995 (+2.3 percentage35
points from 1994), and again in 1996 (+0.5 percentage points).  However, the same percentage
increases are not found in the manufacturing, service, trade and finance industries, while the tax
burden is shown to decrease in 1996 in the resource sector, and in the agricultural, forestry and
fishing sector.
b) ATR results by firm size
In assessing the tax burden on firms according to their size as measured by assets, Canadian
results show variability in corporate ATRs across firms, and over time, not reflected in the
aggregate results.  For example, profitable firms in the $CDN 10-50 million asset range are found
to have the highest ATR, in the order of roughly 29 to 32%, depending on the year, as illustrated
in Figure 5.  Small firms with assets less than $CDN 1 million are found to have considerably
lower ATRs, in the range of 21 to 23%, owing mostly a special small business deduction.
Also, year-to-year fluctuations in ATRs at the disaggregate level are not always reflected in
the aggregate results.  For example, while the corporate ATR for all profitable firms shows the
corporate ATR increasing by 2.5 percentage points from 1994 to 1995, a 3.6 percentage point
increase is found for the most heavily taxed group (in the $CDN 10-50 million range).  For the
same group, the corporate ATR falls in 1996, while the results for all profitable firms show an
increase in the corporate ATR in 1996 by over half a percentage point.  Similarly, the ATR for
firms in the $CDN 1-10 million asset range is shown to decline by 0.5 percentage points in 1996,
while the aggregate data show the ATR increasing by 0.7 percentage points.
The Belgian example takes an alternative approach of grouping firms by gross taxable
income strata, and measuring for each income strata, the percentage distribution of firms across
different ATR ranges.  From this analysis, a general profile is evident, as illustrated in Figure 6.
For all of the income strata, there is a concentration of firms with ATRs close to zero, and a
concentration of firms with ATRs close  to the statutory rate.  Almost half of the smallest firms (in
the fifth stratum with taxable income in the range of 0-21000 euros) are found to have ATRs close
to zero.  A closer look at the micro-data reveal that this finding can be explained largely by loss
carry over claims.  For larger firms, tax expenditures and the exemption system are found to be
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D) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Relying on tax revenue information to measure average tax rates on labour, capital, and
other types of income offers the advantage of incorporating the net effect of a complex set of
factors that determine tax liabilities and are difficult to model.
42  Micro (taxpayer-level) data37
drawn from tax returns provide values for various entries determining final tax calculations, which
can assist in refining measurement techniques.  And micro-data figures can be (partially)
aggregated to cover particular taxpayer groups.  The ability to generate results for different
taxpayer groups offers insights into possibly divergent tax burdens, which in turn helps one
interpret tax burden trends at the aggregate level, and more generally provide an empirical basis
for tax policy analysis.
While in general a micro-level view (by taxpayer-group, or by sector) is necessary to
address many if not most tax policy-related questions, interest also exists in economy-wide
average tax rates derived, for example, for labour or capital income.  This paper reviews work by
Norway and Denmark examining how micro-data can permit a more targeted assessment of
personal tax revenues imposed on different income types to feed into such measures.  In
particular, by isolating taxes that apply to a single income type, and by using taxpayer-specific
(rather than economy-wide) average tax rates to decompose revenues raised by taxes levied on
multiple income types, one can measure average tax rates for different categories of income with
greater precision.
Work by Belgium and Canada highlights the critical importance of adjusting for business
losses in measuring an economy-wide corporate average tax rate, with implications for the proper
measurement of an economy-wide average tax rate on income from capital (including both
corporate and shareholder-level taxation).
43  The insights are important given widespread interest
in corporate tax burdens and their effects, and the general inability of aggregate data to generate a
reliable annual corporate average tax rate series.  The paper reviews a number of possible
adjustment techniques relying on micro-data, and certain issues encountered with each.  While not
addressed in the work reviewed in this paper, the findings also have implications for the
measurement of average tax rates on business or total income of the self-employed.
Perhaps most importantly, the paper underscores the difficulties in drawing policy
conclusions from results based on aggregate data.  An ability to measure average tax rates for
different taxpayer groups is important, as effective tax rates tend to vary, sometimes significantly,
by taxpayer group.  Work by Austria finds significant variation in average tax rates on wage
income across wage levels, raising questions over the use of a single (implicit) tax rate for a given38
year based on aggregate data to assess the tax burden on labour income taxed on a progressive
basis.  The paper argues that assessments of the possible impact of the tax system on labour
market participation are strengthened where one is able to measure average tax rates on labour
income at various income levels and for different taxpayer groups.
The paper also reports significant variation on average corporate tax rates across firms
grouped by industry and firm size.  The analysis by Belgium and Canada reveals that economy-
wide results may be misleading indicators of levels and trends in corporate average tax rates for
certain groups of firms, calling for a disaggregate view to steer policy analysis and decisions.
The paper provides very limited discussion of the use of various micro-based average tax
rates to address specific policy questions.  Such an analysis is beyond the purpose or scope of the
current exercise, which in the main has been to question the extent to which average tax rate
results derived from aggregate data can be taken to be representative where significant diversity in
tax burdens exists at the disaggregate level across taxpayer groups, and where year-to-year
percentage changes in tax burdens are not uniform.
This raises a central issue of the confidentiality of taxpayer information, and the general
inability of those outside government to undertake revenue-based average tax rate analysis at the
micro-level.  This is unfortunate (yet understandable), as broader access to micro-level data would
accelerate progress in this field.  One potentially fruitful area to explore would be to consider
what levels of aggregation of taxpayer-level data would be possible that would maintain
confidentiality, while supporting revenue-based average tax rate analysis on a disaggregate basis.39
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ENDNOTES :
                                                     
1 See Chapter 6 of Tax Burdens–Alternative Measures for a discussion of the relevance of
backward-looking (tax revenue-based) measures to address primarily fairness considerations, and
in particular the sharing of tax burdens, and forward-looking (model-based) measures for taxes on
capital income relevant to assessing investment incentives.
2 As reported in Tax Burdens – Alternative Measures, OECD Tax Policy Studies, No.2 (2000),
and in Tax Ratios – A Critical Survey, prepared by Jakob de Haan and Bjorn Volkerink, released
as OECD Tax Policy Studies, No.5 (2001).
3 For a review of the basic implicit tax rate approach, see Tax Burdens-Alternative Measures.  See
also Carey and Tchilinguirian (2001).
4 Under the implicit tax rate approach, total personal income tax on labour (capital) income is
estimated as the proportion of aggregate personal income tax that aggregate labour (capital)
income is to aggregate personal income.
5 Average tax rates on wage income, which may affect labour market participation decisions, can
differ significantly depending on the wage level and household structure (married vs. single,
principal vs. secondary-earner, with or without children) (see OECD Taxing Wages).  There is
evidence that elasticities of labour demand and supply may differ depending on the taxpayer
group (e.g., primary earners vs. secondary earners) (see R. Blundell (1996)).
6 Income may be separated into labour income or capital income.  Implicit tax rate analysis
generally restricts itself to these two broad income categories (while measuring average tax rates
on other ‘taxable events’, e.g., consumption). Access to micro-data enables measurement of
average tax rates on various types (sub-categories) of income – for example, on alternative items
or groupings of labour income amounts.  A broad definition of labour income would include
wages and salaries, the labour component of returns to the self-employed, and pension income
including social security benefits.  Policy analysis may call for effective tax rate measures for
more narrow definitions of labour income (e.g., excluding pension income).
7 Ordinary income includes wage and salary income (including fringe benefits), pension/benefits
income, imputed labour income of the self-employed, and also capital income (dividends, capital
gains, interest, rents, imputed capital income of self-employed business owners, and other forms
of capital income), less deductions.   A flat 28 per cent rate applies to ordinary income in excess
of a threshold which varies depending on the household structure (Class 1 and Class 2).  The
separate income surtax on gross labour income is imposed at progressive rates with taxable
income thresholds and allowances that also depend on the household structure (Class 1 or Class
2), with no deductions.
8 The revenues from these taxes are aggregated and reported under category 1110 in OECD
Revenue Statistics (‘taxes on income and profits of individuals’).
9 As elaborated in section 1)b), micro-data enable precision in estimating tax imposed on a given
category/type of income by a broad-based tax.41
                                                                                                                                                                            
10 Employee social security contributions are imposed on wage and salary income and pension
income, while social security contributions of the self-employed are imposed on pension income
and imputed labour income of the self-employed.
11 The income surtax is imposed on wage and salary income, imputed labour income of the self-
employed, and pension income.
12 Note that total personal income tax (OT+S) in (2) corresponds to category 1100 in the Revenue
Statistics.
13 In estimating the labour portion of tax on ordinary income, the approach taken in (3a) – unlike
that shown in equation (1a) – does not use taxpayer-level data.  As with the implicit tax rate
approach, it instead relies on an overall weight (w
L) rather than taxpayer-specific weight.  Thus
the exercise concentrates on the benefits of isolating the surtax for the purpose of the average tax
rate calculation.
14 In measuring (3a), the labour component of income from self-employment is measured at the
taxpayer level (and then aggregated) by relying on the split of operating surplus of the self-
employed into labour and capital components as required for tax purposes.  Total labour income
in the numerator of equation 3b) is measured net of deductions allocated to labour.  Ordinary
income OY appearing in the denominator of 3b) is measured from tax returns (gross of the class
allowance).
15 Such features could include special tax deductions or credits tied to employment income (e.g.,
deductions for travel expenses, earned income tax credits).  Similarly, differences in tax burdens
on labour income compared with capital income tied to a progressive tax rate structure would be
taken into account, unlike in the implicit tax rate approach.  If capital income tends to be earned
primarily by taxpayers with relatively high average tax rates, tending to increase the average tax
rate on capital income relative to labour income, results derived using micro-data would account
for this, whereas a reliance on aggregated data would not.  To take another example, taxpayer-
level data can more directly assess features of the tax system that affect the tax burden on income
from capital, for example provisions allowing a partial deduction for interest expense on amounts
borrowed to generate taxable interest income.
16 An estimate of the average tax rate on wage income may be a better indicator of the tax burden
on employment, compared with an average tax rate on labour income broadly defined.
17 The tax rate t can be interpreted as either a flat tax rate, or representing a progressive rate
structure applied to the tax base shown in round brackets.
18 The illustrative framework ignores, for ease of exposition, expenses incurred in earning wage
income – such expenses however can be readily factored in, in a manner analogous to that shown
for expenses in earning ‘other’ income.
19 As pointed out at the CESifo conference, an assessment of income-specific rates would be
important where one is assessing a marginal (as opposed to an average) tax rate.42
                                                                                                                                                                            








closely aligns with the normal implicit tax rate approach (the Austrian results ignore employer
social security contributions and payroll taxes).  While measuring this combined tax rate τ
L
I+II
using micro-data can usefully assess the combined tax burden at various wage levels, information
provided by each series individually is lost in this aggregation.
21 This may be particularly true where benefit levels for those out of work are not high.  Where
they are, consideration of the labour market participation decision should factor in benefit and tax
impacts of taking up work.
22 The discrete change tax rate on wage income (DTR) series is derived by measuring the change
in wage tax per head resulting from a (discrete) increase in gross wages/salaries per head (from
one gross income band to the next).
23 The distorting effects (linked to losses) in implicit tax rate analysis (relying on aggregate data)
are generally more pronounced when attempting to measure an average corporate tax rate.  These
effects, however, also factor in when measuring an average tax rate on income from capital
(incorporating both personal and corporate taxation), given the inclusion of corporate income tax
in the numerator (reduced by loss carry forwards) and operating surplus in the denominator
(reduced by current period losses).
24 Working with micro-data, one could consider measuring an average corporate tax rate for
profitable companies alone by including in the numerator an estimate of corporate tax revenues in
the absence of loss carryover claims and, in the denominator, current period profits of profitable
firms alone (note that such an adjustment would not be possible when relying on aggregate
National Accounts data, as operating surplus in a given year includes the losses of current loss-
making firms).  However, as noted in the main text, ignoring the treatment of losses would omit
important information relevant to assessing the tax burden imposed on the corporate sector.
25 There are also a number of difficult modelling choices, including the use of a fixed or moving-
average aggregation period, and the length and timing of the aggregation period.  Arguably, the
length should reflect the business cycle.  However, business cycles can vary over time and across
countries, making a uniform aggregation procedure difficult.  Also, one could argue that the
aggregation period should take into account the number of years in which losses can be carried
over for tax purposes if loss claims are discretionary.  This recognises that where taxpayers delay
a loss claim in a given year, in favour of another claim (e.g. tax credit) under liberal carryforward
rules, too short an aggregation period could overstate the effective tax burden.
26 The effective corporate tax rate of 20 per cent can be interpreted as resulting from a statutory
corporate tax rate in excess of 20 per cent, with tax expenditures (e.g., accelerated depreciation or
special tax credits) that lower the effective rate to 20 per cent.  Alternatively, one can interpret the
rate as the statutory corporate income tax rate where such tax expenditures are not provided.
27 This is the approach followed by Belgium and Canada in their work.
28 An alternative measure would assess net domestic corporate tax on domestic plus foreign-
source income of resident firms as a percentage of worldwide income.  However, interpreting43
                                                                                                                                                                            
such a measure would be difficult, tending to limit its use.  Where the home country operates an
exemption system, the measure would exclude entirely foreign tax on foreign source income,
relevant to fairness, as well as investment and efficiency considerations.  Similar problems of
interpretation arise where the home country operates a residence-based system, given difficulties
in establishing the amount of foreign tax levied on foreign income.
29 Operating surplus can be measured either gross or net of depreciation of real capital.  While
deriving corporate tax as a percentage of net operating surplus conforms with measures of tax on
income, comparing results across countries is difficult on account of non-uniform measurement of
depreciation in the National Accounts across countries.
30 In each year, a weighted-sample of profitable corporations is chosen (individual firms included
in the sample may vary from one year to the next).  Losses are factored into the analysis through
the treatment of prior-year losses of currently profitable firms (with current year loss claims used
to reduce current year aggregate profits).
31 The adjusted book income figure nets out (taxable and non-taxable) dividend receipts both
domestic and foreign, foreign branch and other (non-business) foreign income, and net equity of
affiliates included in financial income.  As net financial income is measured net of current income
and capital taxes, these amounts are added back to arrive at a pre-tax amount.  Other adjustments
include netting current-period loss claims from book income (including non-capital (business)
losses, net capital losses, and farm losses), and adding back charitable donations.
32 Canadian corporate tax is not imposed on foreign dividends received from treaty countries.
However, the numerator of the Canadian corporate ATR includes some Canadian income tax to
the extent that it exceeds foreign tax credits earned on other foreign source income.  While in
principle this tax should be excluded for consistency with the denominator profit measure, the
inclusion of this tax does not have a significant impact on the results.
33 As the calculation of pre-tax profit begins with net taxable income (already measured net of loss
carry-forward claims), no adjustment is necessary in respect of loss amounts.  Also, by focusing
on taxable firms, the sample includes firms that are profitable in the given year.  As in the
Canadian example, losses are factored in by netting loss carry-forward claims from current year
profits.
34 The special regimes include co-ordination centre, distribution centre and service centre regimes.
35 The tax expenditures include special deductions for investment, exempted gifts, tax relief for
additional staff.  As noted in the text, profits exempted under special regimes are also added back.
These tax expenditures reduce tax liability (and thus factor into the numerator), but do not relate
to pre-tax economic income.
36 Profits earned in countries with which Belgium has a double tax treaty are tax-exempt.  Thus
these profits are excluded from the denominator (net taxable income) and numerator.  Profits
earned in countries with which Belgium does not have a double taxation treaty are taxed at one-
quarter of the nominal rate.  These amounts are included in the denominator and tax thereon is
included in the numerator.  While in principle these amounts should be excluded in a pure
domestic corporate ATR measure, their inclusion does not have a significant impact on the results.44
                                                                                                                                                                            
37 This includes the elimination over the period of deductible notional withholding taxes
(précomptes fictifs) on loans and capital contributions to Belgian co-ordination centres and other
amounts.
38 In order to avoid double counting of losses, it is necessary to exclude current period losses from
current period operating surplus. Without this adjustment, losses of a firm in year t would be taken
into account in year t (through the inclusion in operating surplus of losses of firms in year t), and
also in subsequent years where previously loss-making firms become taxable and claim a loss
carry forward.
39 The inclusion of a tax determined as a percentage of capital stock (or a similar base, as opposed
to profit) is appropriate in a measure of corporate tax paid out of corporate profit.  One can argue
that this inclusion is suitable only where the resulting rate is used for distribution analysis.  When
considering tax consequences of additional investment, one would like to capture additional
capital tax paid as a result of an expanded capital stock.  Including capital tax in the numerator of
a measure used to assess tax burden on investment may be justified where aggregate corporate
profits is proportional to aggregate capital stock.  Note that the Canadian figures are used in the
paper to address distribution issues.
40 Unlike the profit measure in the denominator of the AETRs computed for the profitable group,
the profit measure for the ‘all firm’ series does not net out loss carry forward claims (consistent
with the inclusion of loss making firms).
41 Belgium offers tax relief for supplementary personnel employed in small and medium sized
enterprises, while Canada targets small firms through its small business deduction.
42 It has been pointed out that tax burden measures that factor in tax liabilities, but exclude
taxpayer compliance costs, understate true tax burden. Also, measures that rely on financial
statements to measure corporate profit may be biased to the extent that profits are manipulated
(e.g., overstated).
43 Loss adjustments are also obviously important for analysis at the disaggregate level.CESifo Working Paper Series
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